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INTRODUCTION
Government regulation is as ubiquitous as it is seemingly chaotic. From
grazing fees to toxic waste clean-up and from financial institutions to wel-
fare and education, virtually no part of society or of our lives is untouched
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by government. What we eat, how we vote, and what we listen to on the
radio or watch on television are each affected by government regulation. In
addition to its ubiquity, government regulation has another characteristic: It
is notably unpopular.' Every presidential administration at least since
FDR's has commissioned a presidential task force to get hold of or reform
the "headless fourth branch.",2 Political, especially presidential, candidates
regularly campaign against government regardless of the candidate's party
affiliation. And, small businesses and other parts of the private sector rail
against regulatory costs that threaten their existence. Reacting to these in-
fluences, the Contract with America3 was based on the assumption that vot-
ers positively respond to candidates who promise to get government off their
backs.
Pervasive government regulation, together with its general unpopularity,
poses important questions for our polity: Can sense be made out of the
seeming chaos of government programs? What are the costs and benefits of
government regulation? Is the regulatory state effective in mitigating the
economic and social problems that it addresses? Although administrative
law scholars recognize these issues, most respond with process reforms,
such as greater executive oversight or new methods of statutory interpreta-
tion, rather than by articulating substantive answers concerning what should
be the substantive goals and norms of the regulatory state. Moreover, law
school curricula usually ignore these systemic issues despite their social
significance.
4
An incipient legal literature does exist that addresses the substantive at-
tributes, norms, and goals of regulatory government. This literature, here
called "government regulation scholarship," contains important insights, but
it does not yet yield paradigmatic principles. This article begins to organize
this literature and brings its disparate components into a more coherent rela-
tionship. Our analysis, which proceeds in five parts, describes the current
state of the literature, the conclusions that can be drawn from it, and the
more numerous issues that require further consideration by scholars and
their students.
Part I discusses the end of administrative law scholarship, particularly
1. See generally E.J. DIoNNEa, WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS (1991); WILLIAM B.
GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN DEMOCR.ACY (1992)
2. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (finding
rise of administrative agencies most significant trend of last century).
3. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1995); see also
Common Sense Legal Reform Act, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995); Common Sense Product
Liability Reform, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); Real Welfare Reform Act, H.R. 4566,
104th Cong. (1995); Regulatory Reform and Relief Act, H.R. 926, 104th Cong. (1995).
4. RICHARDA. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 4-15, 84-91 (1995).
[49:2
ANALYZING GO VERNMENT REGULA TION
noting its limitations. Traditional scholarship is largely occupied with the
workings of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),5 related procedural
requirements, and judicial review. Consequently, it makes only a limited
contribution to the discussion of regulatory policy and techniques that con-
stitutes the current debate over government regulation. Government regula-
tion scholarship, by comparison, addresses these systemic issues.
Part II establishes the institutional interaction and process-bound nature
of the regulatory state. It presents a model of the regulatory process that
links the variables of policy, politics, and institutions. Through this model,
we suggest how law, policy, and politics influence regulatory decisions in
the legislature and administrative agency. This exercise rejects exclusive re-
liance on public choice explanations of regulation as inconsistent with the
government regulation literature. Indeed, the strength of the model is that it
permits and invites a multi-disciplinary understanding of government regu-
lation.
Part III proposes a methodology to study government regulation which
parallels case analysis. Just as the study of common law cases yields an un-
derstanding of the principles and structures of much private law, as well as
legal institutions, regulatory analysis yields an understanding of the types of
regulations and institutions used by government to intervene in private mar-
kets. This methodology is a set of building blocks that serves as an intro-
duction to government regulation for law students and as the basis for ad-
vanced study by legal scholars.
The first step in the methodology is to consider the justification for a par-
ticular program of regulation. Part IV describes this step by explaining the
general substantive values and norms of the regulatory state and, in particu-
lar, the tension between economic and noneconomic goals. The subsequent
steps in the methodology consider whether government has chosen the most
appropriate regulatory method to obtain its goals. Part V explains the link-
age between regulatory goals and tools, how regulators may have a choice of
tools with different impacts, and how the choice of tools is affected by po-
litical considerations.
Finally, Part V closes the article by noting some practical and scholarly
implications of this analysis. The methodology should assist law students
and lawyers in understanding better the nature of the regulatory process. It
should also encourage legal scholars to join the debate over the policy, insti-
tutional, and political dimensions of the regulatory state.
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1994).
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I. THE END OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SCHOLARSHIP
Administrative law scholarship has reached the end of the questions it
may pose and answer.6 This is not to say that the study of the administrative
legal process has reached the end of its useful life. To the contrary, tradi-
tional scholarship is increasingly vibrant and important, given the scale and
scope of modem government, particularly so with the hundred-page plus re-
vision of the APA sought by the 104th Congress.7 Here, the "end" of admin-
istrative law scholarship means that the fundamental variables and contours
of the discipline have been defined and that the questions scholars now raise
cannot be answered with reference to those variables or within those con-
tours.
Administrative law does not provide a sufficient vocabulary to resolve is-
sues concerning the substantive scope and nature of regulatory government
because it focuses primarily (and correctly) on law and procedure. Yet, a
growing literature indicates that even a basic understanding of government
regulation depends on an appreciation of substantive policies and politics
and their interrelationship with law. Regulatory lawyers and students of
government regulation must have a broader understanding of the adminis-
trative state beyond the formal rules of administrative law.
Modem administrative law scholarship has evolved through three histori-
cal periods, each of Which emphasized a particular aspect of the field. In the
Progressive and the New Deal Eras, scientific experts and professional bu-
reaucrats fashioned rational, objective public policies.' This policy science
continues and is enjoying some renaissance.9 The post-APA period, roughly
from 1946 through 1965, was a time of administrative law formalism. Ken-
6. "Endism" enjoyed a brief popularity as writers and commentators decried the end
of history, the end of philosophy, and the end of many other disciplines. See, e.g., FRANCIS
FUKUY mNA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992); JAMES A. STEVER, THE END OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS OF THE PROFESSION IN THE POST-PROGRESSIVE ERA
(1988); DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXI-LUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN
THE FIFTIES (1988); JOB DITTBERNER, THE END OF IDEOLOGY AND AMERICAN SOCIAL
THOUGHT (1976); AFTER PHILOSOPHY: END OR TRANSFORMATION? (Kenneth Baynes et al.
eds., 1987); WILLIAM V. SPANOS, THE END OF EDUCATION: TOWARDS POSTHUMANISM
(1993).
7. Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995).
8. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW liv-lxii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994).
9. E.g., SUSAN ROSE-AcKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE
REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE (1992); THOMAS 0. MCG.ARITY, REIN-
VENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
(1991).
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neth Culp Davis,' 0 Louis Jaffe," and company1 2 concentrated on two mat-
ters. First, naturally, these scholars engaged in a close examination of the
APA. Second, they focused on the relationship between courts and agencies
through their analysis of the scope of judicial review. Both areas were fa-
miliar terrain for legal scholars because each required the application of law
through familiar methods of legal analysis.
To this point in its history, administrative law scholarship involved two
key variables-policy and law. With the social regulations that emerged
from the programs of the New Frontier and the Great Society in the mid-
1960s to mid-1970s, the focus of administrative law scholarship shifted to
encompass regulatory politics, particularly the politics of representation and
participation.'
3
Thus, since the turn of the century, administrative law scholarship has
identified the variables of policy, politics, and law as central to regulatory
government. 14 The tricky problem for administrative law scholars was what
to do with these variables once they were identified. 5 Certainly, the pres-
ence of policy and politics makes legal analysis richer if not more complex. '
6
Yet, the seductiveness of policy and politics distracts administrative law
from its mission. For some scholars, policy and politics are so embedded in
administrative law that the system is largely incoherent, as judges mask their
political or policy preferences behind legal formalities. 17 If not disingenu-
10. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (West 1951); KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT (3d ed. 1972).
11. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRA.TIVE ACTION (1965).
12. E.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR
BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 5-11, 14-16 (1962).
13. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv.
L. REV. 1667, 1711-13 (1975) (diagnosing imbalance in public representation during
agency decisionmaking process in that special interest groups are overrepresented and
command agency's attention while agency remains "unresponsive to unorganized inter-
ests").
14. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF BUREAUCRACY 13-15 (1990); GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 189 (1991).
15. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Teaching Administrative Law: The Wonder of the
Unknown, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1983).
16. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline in
Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 120 (1977); Ernest Gellhorn &
Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771 (1975).
17. EDLEY, supra note 14, at 190; Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1276, 1340-44, 1354-55 (1984); Thomas 0. Sargentich,
The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L.
REV. 419, 431 (1987) (summarizing functionalist's critique of judicial use of nondelega-
tion doctrine to limit agency's power).
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ous, the interaction of policy, politics, and law is at least disconcerting. One
can either bemoan the incoherence this interaction produces or seek some
sort of reconciliation or understanding.
Administrative law scholars have responded to this challenge by raising
essential questions about the nature of government. What are the goals and
objectives of the "regulatory state?"' 8  What constitutes "sound govern-
ance"?9 9 What is our "new public agenda"? 21 What constitutes the "public
good" of bureaucratic government? 21 These questions are important, ad-
dressing as they do the essential values of public life and public order. They
are also questions that cannot be answered by the field of administrative law.
In fact, each of the scholars cited appears to have been frustrated trying to
answer these questions with the materials of administrative law. Instead of
articulating substantive answers about what constitutes the norms of the
regulatory state, sound governance, a new public agenda, or the public good,
each scholar pulled his or her punches by resorting to explicitly legal solu-
tions, such as greater judicial control of agency action, 22 closer statutory in-
terpretation,23 tighter congressional oversight,24 or specialized reviewing
courts .25
As long as administrative law scholars attempt to discuss these larger is-
sues of government regulation within the traditional legal formality of ad-
ministrative law doctrines and norms, they will not and cannot address the
substantive and normative issues that underlie the regulatory state. This
roadblock between process and substance has led legal and other analysts to
the creation of a government regulation scholarship that goes beyond law's
necessary formality to address the content and values of the administrative
state
This move for legal scholars is a natural one. Economists and political
scientists contribute to government regulation scholarship, but legal scholars
are the most familiar with the primary materials and with the constitutive
rules of government. Moreover, legal scholars have become adept with
applied policy analysis in their particular fields, such as environmental law
or occupational safety and heath law, and asking broader questions about
18. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE RGu-
LATORY STATE 1-10, 227-33 (1990).
19. EDLEY, supra note 14, ch. 7.
20. RoSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at xi.
21. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 34-38, 185-89.
22. EDLEY, supra note 14, at 236-38, 260; ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 5, ch. 3.
23. ROSE-AcKERMAN, supra note 9, ch. 4; SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 73, 133-37.
24. ROSE-AcKERmAN, supra note 9, at 38, 44, chs. 3-5.
25. EDLEY, supra note 14, at 247-52.
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the good state is naturally appropriate." Finally, legal scholars are not as
constrained by their professional training from considering all of the sub-
stantive implications of law, policy, and politics as are economists or politi-
cal scientists.27
Contributors to the new scholarship face a substantial task in responding
to the questions posed earlier concerning what constitutes "good govern-
ment." In part, scholars are hampered by the lack of a paradigm within
which such questions can be considered. Their task is also complicated by
the schizophrenic political ideology inherent in contemporary administrative
scholarship. The new scholarship is liberal (or neo-liberal2 ) in its skepti-
cism about economic efficiency as the sole criterion for good government,29
in its continued faith in government solutions to socioeconomic problems,3"
and in its concern about public participation in the regulatory state.3 Simul-
26. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (citing examples of policy analysis
by legal scholars).
27. See Martin Shapiro, Of Interest and Values: The New Politics and the New Politi-
cal Science, in THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 3 (Marc K. Landy & Martin A. Levin
eds., 1995) (noting issues raised by political science may require substantive answers, but
political scientists are trained to provide only process solutions).
28. See RANDALL ROTHENBERG, THE NEo-LIBERALS: CREATING THE NEW AMERICAN
POLITICS (1984) (identifying liberals influenced by conservative arguments to adjust tradi-
tional liberal concepts of, and approaches to, government).
29. EDLEY, supra note 14, at ix-xi; ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 16-19;
SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 39, 42-45, 228-29; ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 3; Robert L.
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation
Scheme, 52 MD. L. REv. 951, 977 (1993) (discussing administration compensation scheme
as alternative to current tort liability for mass toxics claims); Peter H. Schuck, Regulation,
Non-Market Values, and the Administrative State: A Comment on Professor Stewart, 92
YALE L.J. 1602, 1608 (1983) (analyzing Professor Stewart's trinity of justifications for
administrative action, securing rights, promoting efficiency, and protecting non-commodity
values); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity
Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537 (1983).
30. EDLEY, supra note 14, at ix; Rabin, supra note 29, at 981-82; ROBINSON, supra
note 14, at 4; ROSE-AcKERMAN, supra note 9, at 188-89; Schuck, supra note 29, at 1607-
08; SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 12, 70-71, 74-75, 229-30; see also STEPHEN G. BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 80-81 (1993)
(advocating structural changes in agencies so agency regulations will better reflect soci-
ety's needs and consequently enhance public's trust in agencies' ability to deal effectively
with socioeconomic problems).
31. BREYER, supra note 30, at 73; EDLEY, supra note 14, at 213; Rabin, supra note
29, at 968; ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 58-61; ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 9, ch. 13;
Stewart, supra note 29, at 1586-87; Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41
DUKE L.J. 1463, 1465, 1473-75 (1992); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the
Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions
Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 298-300; PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN
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taneously, it is conservative (or neo-conservative 2 ) in its reliance on policy
analysis, in its use of market-based solutions,34 and in its reluctant accep-
tance of administrative agencies.
35
We recognize that agreement about what constitutes good government
will be difficult to come by as the previous schizophrenia demonstrates. But
it is important to have this discussion. James Morone explains that public
unease about government is related to the reliance on process norms to le-
gitimize regulatory programs.36  Cognizant of the country's strong liberal
heritage, reformers have sought to reassure the public about government by
stressing its accountability through administrative and political processes.
As a result, "Americans have failed to institutionalize a communal spirit-
an active notion of the people-within their government. ''37 This process
orientation has two impacts. It stresses the risks posed by government with-
out establishing any philosophy of the benefits to be gained from govern-
ment. Without a philosophy of government, the risks posed by government
cannot be weighed and measured. The new government regulation scholar-
ship addresses this deficiency.
REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983).
32. See PETER STEINFELS, THE NEO-CONSERVATIVES (1979) (identifying conservatives
influenced by liberal arguments to adjust traditional conservative concepts of; and ap-
proaches to, government).
33. RoSE-AcKERMAN, supra note 9, ch. 13.
34. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative St,bstance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 631-42. Con-
gress should adopt "flexible, market-oriented incentive-based regulated strategies" that
focus on the ends to be achieved while allowing the market to determine the means that
would most effectively eliminate the harmful activity. Id. at 632-33.
35. EDLEY, supra note 14, at 263; ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 37-38, ch. 3; Rabin,
supra note 29, at 954-55, 982; ROsE-ACKERmN, supra note 9, at 95-96; Harold J. Krent,
Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 710 (1994) (reviewing DAVID
SCHOE NBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Dele-
gation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 323 (1987). "Public antipathy to overregulation by
Washington bureaucracies could provide popular support for judicial requirements that
Congress legislate more specifically in order to limit agency discretion." Id. at 324. How-
ever, Professor Stewart seriously doubts that courts will revive the delegation doctrine to
invalidate congressional statutes. He contends that the country has increasingly relied on
"centralized command and control regulation" to achieve social goals and economic jus-
tice, which has created further burdens on Congress. He suggests "outright deregulation"
in some areas and creating "new reconstitutive strategies of regulation" in others. Id. at
328-29.
36. J.MES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE
LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ch. 8 (1990).
37. Id. at 29.
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II. THE REGULATORY PROCESS
The distinction between traditional administrative law scholarship and
government regulation scholarship is not semantic. The objects of study are
different. Administrative law is procedural and formalistic." While policy
controversies abound at the margins of procedure, administrative law pri-
marily answers questions about whether the APA was followed, which
branch of government should be the proper decisionmaker as a matter of ju-
risdiction, the scope of judicial review, and the ambit of statutory and regu-
latory interpretation. To be sure, the marginal controversies dramatically
determine who will be the winners and losers of the regulatory game. Yet,
these are essentially legal questions albeit with political and policy conse-
quences. Nevertheless, traditional scholarship cannot tell us what good pol-
icy should be or what the ideal political landscape should look like. Nor can
it tell us which policy proposals are likely to succeed or fail. Rather, the
role of government regulation scholarship is to develop the policy and politi-
cal dimensions of the regulatory state.
Where administrative law is procedural, government regulation is sub-
stantive because it explores political and policymaking processes and, in
turn, uncovers the policy arguments, political influences, and legal con-
straints that determine public policies. Indeed, the heart of government
regulation is to assess the relationship of policy, politics, and law to each
other, and to articulate the substantive and normative attributes of the regu-
latory state. In this section, we suggest a process model of government
regulation that grew out of our efforts to teach law students about the nature
39
of the regulatory process.
A. An Interactive Model
The basic understanding of government regulation is that regulations
emanate from administrative agencies. This basic understanding is partial,
however. A better understanding of government regulation incorporates the
interaction between agencies and the legislature as well as judicial review of
the actions of both branches. Simply stated, agencies cannot act without
legislative authorization, and that authorization comes in two basic forms.
Most frequently, legislatures pass broad statutes and leave the details of
legislation to be filled in by agencies. This maneuver allows legislators to
gain credit for legislation, avoid blame for regulatory failures, and provide
38. See generally PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES (1989).
39. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO& JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY (1993).
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services to their constituenciesi ° The other form of legislation is narrower
in scope, either establishing entitlements to be administered by agencies41 or
correcting regulatory failures.4 2 Thus, regulation is the product of the inter-
action between the legislative allocation of authority and implementation by
administrative agencies.
Our model posits that regulation in the legislative arena is the product of
the interaction of politics, policy, and law (see Figure 1 below).43 The circle
marked "politics" represents legislative proposals that have political sup-
port.44 The circle marked "policy" represents those regulatory alternatives
for which rational policy arguments can be made.45  The line marked
"constitutional law" constrains the adoption of some alternatives (those be-
low the line) that have political support but lack constitutional authority.
40. Peter H. Aronson, Ernest Gellhom & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1982).
41. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
42. See, e.g., Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1994); Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
43. Our model can be contrasted with the "interactive institutional" model of
Eskridge and Frickey. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. RFv. 26, 33-42 (1994). They argue that constitutional institu-
tions tend to interact so as to bring law into equilibrium. Id. at 35. Their model is similar
to and congenial with this analysis to a point, but their analysis is narrower than the one
presented here because it pays less explicit attention to the exogenous variables of policy
and politics.
44. Of course, the intensity of political support will vary according to the impact of a
proposal on stakeholders and other interested parties. See infra notes 72-74 and accompa-
nying text (discussing intensity of support). The claim here is only that political support is
a necessary element for legislation to be adopted.
45. A rational policy argument is one that would be recognized as legitimate by the
community of policy analysts that analyze and debate an issue or group of issues. See JOHN
W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 138-45 (1st ed. 1984)
(discussing policy alternatives debated and tested within policy communities).
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Figure 1. Legislative Decisions
For example, parents may support the use of school vouchers to pay tui-
tion at private religious schools, but legislation establishing such funding
may be a violation of the Establishment Clause.46 According to the model,
proposed laws must fit into the overlap between the policy and politics cir-
cles as necessary conditions to survive the legislative process.
Figure 2 depicts the relationship of policy, politics, and law in the agency
arena. As in the legislature, an agency's regulatory decisions are influenced
by the interaction of law, politics, and policy. An agency, however, has less
discretion to react to these influences than does a legislature because its
enabling act prevents it from adopting some regulatory alternatives that have
policy and political support. For example, the use of food color additives
that pose a de minimis risk of cancer might be good policy and might enjoy
political support, but the Delaney clause forbids the Food and Drug Ad-
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J.
259, 280-81 (1991) (reviewing JHN E. CruBB& TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MRKETS, AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990)). Most legislative proposals, however, are likely to be consti-
tutional because of the deference that the Supreme Court usually gives Congress. See, e.g.,
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (applying rational basis test to
equal protection claim); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (applying rational basis test
to determine whether regulated activity affects interstate commerce). Moreover, the power
of Congress to act is virtually unlimited by the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3; see, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). Likewise, state legislation has
almost unlimited authority as a matter of the state's police powers. See, e.g., Finucane v.
Pennsylvania Milk Mktg. Bd., 582 A.2d 1152 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). The Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States, v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), however, places
some outer limit on the commerce power.
19971
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
ministration from approving such additives. 47 Thus, a regulatory decision
will be one that satisfies constitutional and statutory law and that, at least
initially, has political and policy support. These decisions are located in
Figure 2 in the intersection of the policy and political circles that is located
above the two legal baselines established by statutory and constitutional law
constraints.
REGULATORY DECISIONS
(POLICY
STATUTO LAW
CO ITUTI NAL W
POLITICS
Figure 2. Regulatory Decisions
Finally, in Figure 3, we enlarge on the concept that constitutional and
statutory law limit the capacity of agencies to choose specific regulatory
policies. 48 An organization's capacity to act is affected by its institutional
framework, which includes legal constraints, but more generally consists of
the institutional arrangements, capacities, and incentives present in any ad-
ministrative environment. 49 Agency decisions will be affected by such non-
47. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 409(c)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1994); see
Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that Delaney
clause prohibits FDA from listing as safe any cancer causing food color additive).
48. A similar model used at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University posits that regulatory decisions are the product of organizational capacity, vi-
sion/purpose, and external environment. MATERIALS FOR PROGRAM FOR SENIOR MANAGERS
IN GOVERNMENT (1993) (copy on file with author). These influences relate to policy
(vision/purpose), politics (external environment), and institutional framework
(organizational capacity).
49. G.RY MUCCIARONI, REVERSALS OF FORTUNE: PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE IN-
TERESTS 9 (1995); see generally J.AmES G. MARCH & JOH-lAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING
INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS (1989); JAMES Q. WILSON, Bu-
REAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT (1989).
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legal factors as institutional routines, bureaucratic culture, professional
training, and agency resources. 5°
REGULATORY DECISIONS
INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
P 
-' 
L IT IC S
Figure 3. Regulatory Process
For example, day-to-day decisionmaking in the Social Security Admini-
stration is controlled by sophisticated techniques of organization and man-
agement.51 Thus, as depicted in Figure 3, some policy choices that are ac-
ceptable as a matter of politics and policy (located in the overlapping
circles) are ruled out by some aspect of the institutional framework (the por-
tion of the overlapping circles outside of the rectangular framework).
B. Beyond Public Choice
The proposed model specifies a role for policy arguments, political influ-
ence, and institutional factors in regulatory decisionmaking. Two insights
about the regulatory process may be drawn from the model. First, the model
has some general predictive power. The success of a regulatory proposal
requires the favorable congruence of policy, political, and institutional fac-
tors. Because the generality of this insight limits the model's predictive
power, the model is more useful for a second insight: The model rejects a
purely public choice orientation that regulatory decisions result solely from
50. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (explaining how institutional influ-
ences impact agency decisionmaking).
51. JERRY L. MASH, W, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: IMANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY Dis-
ABILITY CLAIMS 166-68 (1983).
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self-interest. For this reason, the impact of policy arguments and institu-
tional influence on government regulation has important implications for the
study and practice of regulatory law. These implications suggest a method-
ology to analyze government regulation which will be described below.
The model shows the interaction of the variables and reveals certain pat-
terns. All proposals must satisfy the legal requirements. Further, the policy
and politics variables interact in certain ways. When a regulatory program
makes strong policy sense, there is a powerful inference that it is the product
of a deliberative process rather than public choice politics. 52 Alternatively,
when the policy rational is substantially weak, the lack of a rationale sup-
ports the conclusion that a program is the result of self-interested behavior.
Many programs, however, fall somewhere in between these extremes. Con-
ceming these programs, proponents and opponents make policy arguments
whose validity is not easily determined. Thus, outcomes are determined by
the efficacy of the policy evidence, the political feasibility of the supporting
arguments, and the impact of institutional influences.
The model predicts which proposals on the agenda of a legislature or
agency will survive and which are likely to fail. It specifies that proposals
that lack policy, political, or institutional support cannot survive the regula-
tory process. Although this prediction is general and requires refinement, it
is a useful starting point. For one thing, the model leaves room for the vari-
ous positive or descriptive theories of government regulation, such as public
interest, 53 public choice,5 4 and organizational and institutional theories.5" In-
deed, the value of the model is to link the variables and to suggest that no
one dimension of the regulatory state5 6 nor any one academic discipline57 is
52. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bath-
water: Justice Breyer's Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721 (1995).
53. See generally STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987).
54. See, e.g., Samuel Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19
J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MoMT. SCI. 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
55. MLARCH & OLSEN, supra note 49.
56. MUCCIARONI, supra note 49, at 1-10, ch. 6; George Priest, The Origins of Utility
Regulation and the Theories of Regulation Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1993); RICHARD
H.K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA ch. 1
(1994).
57. Consider, for example, the insights provided in histories of regulation. MORTON
KELLER, REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CFLANGE IN AMERICA,
1900-1933 (1994); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937
(1991); REGULATION: ECONOMIC THEORY AND HISTORY (Jack C. High ed., 1991); MORTON
KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHLA.NGE IN AMERICA,
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sufficient to capture its dynamism. In particular, the model belies a purely
public choice orientation that regulatory decisions result from self-interested
behavior. Although self-interest is an important influence and can be domi-
nant, policy analysis plays an important role in the regulatory process.
Public choice scholarship describes regulatory politics as composed of
market-like transactions between those who demand regulation (the buyers)
and those who supply it (the sellers). 8 In public choice theory, business and
producer groups are expected to prevail because these interests have a sig-
nificantly greater economic incentive to be politically active than do citizens
who are affected by legislative action.59 Moreover, according to theory,
these organized interests and their political sponsors develop relationships
that are highly resistant to change by outsiders."
The influence of organized interests on regulatory politics is indisputable,
but the public choice approach does not explain significant elements of the
regulatory state. Industry and producer groups have been unable to stop the
passage of many environmental, health and safety, and consumer protection
laws and are still unable to secure the repeal of those laws.61 They have also
1900-1933 (1990).
58. The buyers are organized interests that support or oppose regulation according to
the self-interest of their members. The sellers are public officials who make regulatory
decisions according to their own self-interest. Legislators respond to buyers who offer
support for reelection, while agency officials respond to buyers who can assist them to ob-
tain additional power and prestige and larger budgets. When organized interests compete,
the outcome depends on what group or groups offer the greatest rewards to legislators or
administrators. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-23 (1991) [hereinafter LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE]; JOE B.
STEVENS, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE chs. 7-10 (1993).
59. When a government action affects a small number of persons or entities in a sig-
nificant manner, they have an adequate incentive to join in collective action. By compari-
son, when legislation affects a large number of persons, the impact on any single individ-
ual is usually so small that it is less than the cost of joining in a collective action.
Moreover, individuals who succeed as "free-riders" on the political efforts of others will be
better off. Smaller groups are generally more successful in overcoming this constraint.
James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357 (James
Q. Wilson ed., 1980); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 43-52 (1971).
60. THEODORE J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF
PUBLIC AUTHORITY 90 (1969).
61. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Occupational Safety and Health: Policy Options and Po-
litical Reality, 31 Hous. L. REV. 13, 22-37 (1994) (analyzing whether workers can over-
come weak political power to enact stronger health and safety legislation); Donald T.
Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of
Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 407-20 (1993) (analyzing why envi-
ronmentalists prevailed in enactment of environmental legislation); see generally Martin
Shapiro, supra note 27, at 5. Shapiro states that:
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been unable to stop deregulation efforts that disfavored the airline, trucking,
62banking, and telecommunications industries or to prevent unfavorable tax
legislation.63 Thus, although public choice scholarship predicts that busi-
ness and producer groups should prevail because they have more political
influence and economic muscle than their opponents, often the outcomes are
otherwise.
The public choice explanation falls short in explaining the origins of
regulation because it does not account for the influence of "ideas" 64 or of
policy considerations in regulatory decisionmaking that are not about self-
interest.65 This insight is the focus of what has been described as the "new
the rather elegant theory that built to the conclusion that Congress could pass legis-
lation that diffused costs among the taxpayers in general while concentrating bene-
fits on specific interest groups and could not pass legislation that concentrated costs
on identifiable groups but created diffuse or "public" benefits has been confounded
by much of the major legislative product of the Congress during the past thirty years.
Id.
62. See VIETOR, supra note 56, at I ("Before deregulation, observers of the political
process generally believed that the mutual interests of bureaucrats, legislators, and regu-
lated businesses were so strong that significant reform was unlikely, if not impossible.").
63. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF T.A-x REFORM (2d ed. 1988).
64. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY
10 (1981) (arguing that political explanations of government fail to account for significant
impact of ideas); see also JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994) (analyzing role of deliberation
in policymaking); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RE_
CESSION AND WAR (1995) (analyzing role of ideas of Keynesianism and consumer spending
on national economic policy from 1937 to 1945); RIcHAR.D N. GOODWIN, PROMISES TO KEEP:
A CALL FOR A NEW AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992) (offering background ideas for modern
government); MORONE, supra note 36, chs. 3, 4 (explaining how dynamic view of democ-
racy shapes administrative state); WILSON, supra note 49, at 67-68 (discussing influence of
political ideology in administrative decisionmaking); Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation
History as Politics or Markets, 12 YALE J. ON REO. 549 (1995) (book review) (contending
that historians should acknowledge role of ideas and values in legislative choices).
65. See GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, EVIDENCE, ARGUMENT AND PERSUASION IN THE POLICY
PROCESS 1 (1989) ("Political parties, the electorate, the legislature, the executive, the
courts, the media, interest groups, and independent experts all engage in a continuous
process of debate and reciprocal persuasion."); LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 58, at
24-33 (concluding that economic model overlooks importance of ideology); Michael E.
Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 193-94 (Special Issue 1990)
(establishing that public officials respond to self-interested and other-regarding motives);
Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and
Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1991) (asserting public choice model is
based on faulty assumptions concerning legislative behavior); Richard H. Pildes & Eliza-
beth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism,
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politics of public policy,"66 which represents a "shift of concern from inter-
ests to values, from procedure to substance, from the correlation of prefer-
ences to the attainment of good, or at least the better, or perhaps (to put the
matter more succinctly) a movement from will to reason., 67 Thus, the link-
ages between policy arguments and regulatory outcomes are not easily ob-
served, because often the motivating factor-an idea-is difficult to track,
and its influence is difficult to measure. 68 Yet, the process by which politics
and policy come together can be described. Moreover, this description veri-
fies the central role of policy arguments in regulatory decisionmaking.
Once Congress decides to act,69 interest groups and political actors com-
pete to influence which solutions are adopted by advocating policies that
serve their interests. 7' Although an interest group must have at least some
political power to be successful, 71 even powerful groups do not depend on
political influence alone. Rather, they spend considerable time and money
developing policy rationales for their proposals, 72 and their lobbyists stress
the importance of making good policy arguments .73 Which alternative pol-
icy the legislature will adopt depends on the relative merits of competing
proposals, on the political influence of the competing parties, and on institu-
tional arrangements in Congress.74 Thus, political intensity can fuel the pas-
sage of policies with marginal policy justifications, and good ideas can pre-
and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2127 (1990) (asserting that social
choice theory does not fully describe "general legitimacy and meaningfulness of demo-
cratic decisionmaking"); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A
Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA.
L. REv. 1, 76-94 (1990) (finding that public choice explanations must be supplemented to
account for other legislative motivations, including lawmakers' ideological satisfaction).
66. See THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 27, at ix-xii (describing role
of policy ideas in regulatory decisionmaking and impact of such ideas on regulatory poli-
tics).
67. Martin Shapiro, supra note 27, at 12.
68. Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Rapid Legal Change: Immigration Policy in the
1980s, in THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 27, at 51.
69. See KINGDON, supra note 45, at 3-4 (describing "agenda setting" as process by
which legislature recognizes problem as requiring legislative solution).
70. Id. at 52; FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 29 (1993).
71. See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, GIANT KILLERS 45 (1986) ("Reports to Congress sug-
gesting controversial action, unaccompanied by political momentum, ordinarily move the
Congress with all the force of a bulldozer with an empty gas tank.").
72. DAVID M. RICCI, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE NEW
WASHINGTON AND THE RISE OF THINK TANKS 165-66 (1993).
73. BRUCE C. WOLPE, LOBBYING CONGRESS: How THE SYSTEM WORKS 24 (2d ed.
1996); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICY
MAKING ch. 2 (1993).
74. KINGDON, supra note 45, at 170-72, 209-10; MUCCLARONI, supra note 49, at 9.
1997]
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
vail even in the face of intense political opposition. Moreover, the impact of
policy and politics can be blunted or accelerated by institutional arrange-
ments in Congress.75
Several reasons account for the impact of policy on regulatory decision-
making. 76 Building coalitions among groups with different conceptions of
self-interest and of the public interest requires finding general ideas in com-
mon. Moreover, political success is more likely if people defend their initia-
tives as consistent with existing policies, institutions, and implementation
capacities and, more generally, with social norms concerning the appropriate
role of the state in society77 or with society's normative and emotional
commitments. 71 In particular, ideas are necessary to defend initiatives as
consistent with general public purposes in light of public distrust of special
interest pleading.79 Ideas, according to Peter Schuck, also "give eloquent
voice to a previously inarticulate sense among members of the public that
social values and ways of thinking are changing and that policies therefore
need to be brought into harmony with these new practices. By engendering a
kind of cognitive dissonance, ideas can underscore tensions in our political
life, stimulating the search for new modes of behavior or governance.""
When a regulatory decision has been delegated to an administrative
agency, ideas are important for additional reasons. Agency decisionmakers
are usually lawyers, economists, or members of other professions who are
socialized to approach problem-solving in a rational manner.81 Administra-
tors are also more likely to act rationally because there is judicial review, in
which neutral decisionmakers determine whether the agency applied its ex-
pertise to technical problems in a bona fide way and responded to significant
75. MUCCIARONI, supra note 49, at 9.
76. This analysis follows Schuck, supra note 68, at 77-85 (relating ideas to interests
in relation to policymaking).
77. See MORONE, supra note 36, at 4 (reformers deflect public concerns about aggre-
gation of power in government by promising that changes will yield communal democ-
racy).
78. See, e.g., ROBERTN. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY (1991); FRANCES MOORE
LAPPE, REDISCOVERING AMERICA'S VALUES (1989); see generally HERBERT MCCLOSKY &
JoHN ZALLER, THE AMERICAN ETHOS: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CAPITALISM AND
DEMOCRACY (1984).
79. James Q. Wilson, New Politics, New Elites, Old Publics, in THE NEW POLITICS OF
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 27, at 252 ("Policy making has been rationalized in the sense
that partial interests are now suspect and general interests are thought paramount.")
80. Schuck, supra note 68, at 80; see HUNTINGTON, supra note 64, chs. 3-4 (observing
that instability follows either excess consensus or dissonance).
81. See RICi-LARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PROCESS § 1.9 (2d.ed.
1992) (discussing role of organizational norms in agency decisionmaking).
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objections from affected persons. 2 In addition, recent presidents have im-
posed their own analytical requirements that agencies must justify signifi-
cant rules by comparing their benefits and costs and by identifying other
regulatory impacts.8 3 Congress is considering codifying and extending such
84
requirements.
As noted, the professional training of administrative personnel will affect
their reaction to policy arguments. Professional training is one of several
institutional factors that can influence agency decisionmaking. Decisions
will also be affected by such additional bureaucratic influences as institu-
tional routines," bureaucratic culture, 6 and agency resources.8 7 Because
these influences may or may not be synchronized with regulatory initiatives,
they can have the effect of assisting, modifying, or blocking such changes.88
For example, the hostility to regulation among the White House personnel
charged with regulatory oversight in the Reagan administration stymied the
efforts of regulatory agencies.89 Similarly, the extent to which the public
can effectively influence agency decisionmaking can influence the outcome
of regulatory decisions. 9° Finally, because institutions differ concerning
their capacity to implement regulation, some regulatory regimes may be
more effective than others. 9'
Despite the apparent impact of policy deliberations and institutional fac-
tors on regulatory outcomes, public choice scholars remain skeptical. 92 Yet,
82. Thus, the possibility of judicial review can be a significant hedge against arbi-
trariness, even if it does not occur in every case. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD
STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY 307 (1979).
83. THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 17-25 (1991); see Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 128 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,866,
3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
84. See Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995)
(proposing legislation that would codify and extend analytical requirements for agency
rulemaking).
85. MARCH& OLSEN, supra note 49, ch. 2.
86. WILSON, supra note 49, ch. 6 (analyzing impact of bureaucratic culture on agency
decisionmaking).
87. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW &
MAKE POLICY 90 (1994).
88. MUCCLARONI, supra note 49, at 8, 18.
89. Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Pol-
icy, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1994).
90. SAPIRO & ToMtAIN, supra note 39, ch. 4.
91. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTI-
TUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
92. E.g., Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The
Case for the "'Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. 179, 181 (1988) (investigating substance of cri-
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as Donald Green and Ian Shapiro have recently demonstrated, "successful
empirical applications.of rational choice models have been few and far be-
tween. 93 They and other analysts do not deny the potential explanatory
power of public choice theories, but they oppose the concept that a general,
all encompassing theory of politics can be built on the infrastructure of self-
interested behavior.94 At bottom, then, the public choice conception of pub-
lic behavior is at odds with what one can observe.
III. REGULATORY ANALYSIS
In light of the model, it is no accident that a significant part of what ad-
ministrative lawyers and lobbyists do is to present and debate policy argu-
ments.95 For agency lawyers, the focus is whether the agency can defend the
exercise of its discretion as being consistent with its statutory mandate. For
private lawyers, the goal is to steer the agency (or a legislature) to a policy
choice that maximizes the objectives of the client. The arguments raised in
agencies and Congress range from the particular, such as whether airbags
reduce automobile injuries and deaths,96 to meta-arguments about the role of
government in society, such as whether the government should fund social
and educational services for illegal aliens9" or eliminate or reduce affirmative
action.9" What these policy arguments have in common, however, is that
they concern the substantive nature and scope of regulatory government.
A. The Origins of Regulatory Analysis
Regulatory debates draw on the emerging government regulation scholar-
ship. Experience in teaching government regulation suggests a methodology
tique of public choice based on role of policy influences),
93. DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A
CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE ix (1994).
94. Id. at 184; see supra notes 64-65 (citing other analysts seeking pluralistic account
of public decisionmaking).
95. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Reflections on Teaching Administrative Law: Time for a
Sequel, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 501-02 (1991) (describing speech by prominent Washing-
ton regulatory lawyer who argued that such lawyers spend most of their time advocating
policy positions).
96. See SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 39, at 3-20 (describing policy debate at Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning airbags).
97. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (West Supp. 1996). The § 130 heading,
"Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Publicly Funded Health Care," was taken from the cap-
tion of Proposition 187, § 6, a California Initiative Measure approved Nov. 8, 1994.
98. George Skelton, Affirmative Action Issue: Another 187?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1995, at A3; Steven A. Holmes, White House Signals an Easing on Affirmative Action,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1995, at 9.
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of regulatory analysis modeled on the common law analysis used to read
cases. Likewise, it is intended to establish background knowledge that opens
up the study of government regulation literature.
Many if not most of the policy arguments that turn up in legislative and
administrative deliberations originate in policy communities composed of
specialists, such as congressional staffers, people in planning and evaluation
offices, interest group analysts, and academics. 99 In John Kingdon's won-
derful metaphor, the generation of arguments in this community resembles a
process of natural selection."'° As in natural selection, there is a pattern to
the ideas that survive and prosper. Some of the criteria for survival are in-
ternal to the policy community, such as technical feasibility and consistency
with the professional values of that community. Other criteria are dictated
by the political environment, such as tolerable cost, public acquiescence, and
a reasonable chance for receptivity among elected decisionmakers.101 In
particular, previous policy successes and failures influence the development
of policy strategies during any one period.10 2 Ideas that meet all of these
criteria are likely to be serious, viable policy proposals, while ideas that fall
short might be reworked or combined with other ideas and then proposed
again.
3
The origin of many issues on the current political agenda, including issues
such as health,' ° welfare,105 and telecommunications, 10 6 can be traced back
to the academic policy literature. Policy ideas produced in think tanks and
policy institutes, however, may not be subject to the same level of scrutiny in
99. See Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: Economic
Policymaking in Britain, 25 CoMP. POL. 275, 289 (1993) (explaining that government
policymakers are linked to society by flows of ideas between government policymaking
and policy debates).
100. KINGDON, supra note 45, at 122-23.
101. Id. at 138; MAJONE, supra note 65, ch. 3.
102. Steven R. Smith, The Role of Institutions and Ideas in Health Care Policy, 20 J.
HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 385, 387 (1995).
103. KINGDON, supra note 45, at 138.
104. See, e.g., Alain Enthoven, Managed Competition of Alternative Delivery Systems,
13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 305 (1988); SETTING DOMESTIC PRIORITIES: WHAT CAN
GOVERNMENT Do? ch. 2 (Henry J. Aaron & Charles L. Schultze eds., 1992); MICHAEL D.
REAGAN, CURING THE CRISIS: OPTIONS FOR AMERICA'S HE.AmTH CARtE (1992); PAUL STARR,
THE LOGIC OF HEALTH CARE REFORM (1992).
105. See, e.g., MARY Jo BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM
RHETORIC TO REFORM (1994); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE,
POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS (1992); MICKEY KAus, THE END OF EQUALITY (1992).
106. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE GEODESIC NETWORK I: 1993 REPORT ON
COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (1992); MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (1992).
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political debates as the venting that occurs in academic circles. As a result,
policy proposals may be politically successful even though they lack a dis-
tinguished academic pedigree or distort the findings of academic analysts.
10 7
A model of the policy process that identifies the roles of policy, politics,
and law opens up the study of the substance and norms of government
regulation. Once it is accepted that all three factors play an important role
in policy deliberations, the study of regulation moves from an orientation on
self-interested economic behavior, represented by public choice theory, into
the more complex world of political behavior. Furthermore, the study of
regulation moves beyond the formal rules and procedures of administrative
law into the complex world of policy and politics. Current examples of such
government regulation scholarship include recent studies of automobile
safety, 10 8 environmental standards, 109 nuclear power,110 risk regulation,"'
product safety hazards, 12 social security and welfare," 3 and workplace
health and safety."1
4
B. A Methodology
Just as the common law method mines cases to uncover basic legal prin-
ciples, regulatory analysis mines the statutes and regulations (together with
judicial glosses) to uncover the basic principles of the modem state. While
case analysis reveals the principles and structures of much private law,
regulatory analysis reveals the principles and structures of public law. In
addition, regulatory analysis yields an understanding of the types of policy
justifications and techniques used by government to intervene in private
markets. From these justifications and techniques, the analyst can begin to
describe the substantive values and norms of the regulatory state.
107. See, e.g., PAUL R. KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY: ECONOMIC SENSE AND
NONSENSE IN THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS 10-19 (1994) (describing rise and fall
of supply-side economic theory).
108. JERRY L. MASHAw& DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
109. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR How
THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULPHUR COAL
PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981).
110. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION (1987).
111. BREYER, supra note 30; CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE LAW (1993).
112. Ross E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTORS (1990).
113. THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE:
PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES (1990); BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 105.
114. THOMAS 0. McGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (1993).
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Ever since the New Deal, the regulatory state has expanded to the point
where it has largely displaced the common law. Today, the ordinary tools of
the regulatory lawyer are statutes and regulations rather than cases. Case
analysis, which proceeds by identifying relevant facts, pertinent issues of
law, the holding of the court, and the court's rationale for its holding, is a
legal skill necessary for the practice of law. 5 The great strength of the
common law method is that it provides lawyers with a way to read cases in
any discipline and to derive from those cases the essential arguments, fun-
damental principles, and justifications that drive the common law. Case
analysis works less well in explaining regulatory decisions involving statu-
tory and regulatory rules. 116 For that, one must turn to regulatory analysis.
Regulatory analysis functions similarly to case analysis, uncovers the
principles and arguments behind the justifications for government interven-
tion in markets, and reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the regulatory
tools employed to correct market defects. Regulatory analysis is a way of
understanding government regulation by identifying and analyzing patterns
of regulatory activity that cut across industries and markets, just as case
analysis cuts across various areas of private law. Regulatory analysis also
helps explain the limits and benefits of regulatory tools. Finally, in the
situation of deregulation and regulatory reform, regulatory analysis can
explicate the limits of regulation itself.
Figure 4 indicates how regulatory analysis proceeds along a logical path
similar to case analysis.
17
115. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 109-21 (1993); MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY ch. 9 (1994).
116. There are several differences between common law cases and statutory or regula-
tory cases. First, common law cases are more ad hoc (involving individuals and rarely
whole markets) than regulatory and statutory cases. Second, statutory and regulatory cases
are often more detailed, procedural, and situation-specific than common law cases. Third,
common law cases reflect a longer tradition and, consequently, are more sensitive to their
precedential consequences than are statutory or regulatory cases. Fourth, the
"interpretation" of common law cases differs from that of statutory or regulatory cases be-
cause of the existence of a text in the latter cases. Fifth, the authority of judges is greater
in common law adjudication. Sixth, principles and standards are more likely to apply to
common law cases, while detailed regulations and canons of interpretation apply to statu-
tory and regulatory cases. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
ch. 8 (1990) (distinguishing common law and statutory law).
117. This analysis is suggested by the pioneering work of Justice Breyer. See STEPHEN
G. BREYER, REGULATION .AND ITS REFORM (1982).
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CASE ANALYSIS REGULATORY ANALYSIS
Fact Analysis: Which factors Market Analysis: Does a market
are relevant? produce results inconsistent with
economic or other social values?
Legal Issue: Which legal issues Policy Issue: Which regulatory
apply to the factual predicate? methods (institutions and tools)
will produce more consistent
market or social results?
Holding: Which rule of law Resolution: Which regulatory
disposes of the dispute? method is being used?
Ratio: Assess whether the holding Ratio: Assess the efficacy and
addresses the identified problem political feasibility of other
and furthers justice. regulatory methods.
Figure 4: Case and Regulatory Analysis
The first issue addresses the reason for government regulation. Simply
stated, does government have an economic or noneconomic justification to
intervene in a private market?'18
An economic justification exists when a market fails to perform in an ef-
ficient manner and government intervention is intended to address this
"market failure." The economics literature recognizes a limited number of
such failures. The question is whether a market appears to be subject to one
or more of these defects. A noneconomic justification exists when a market
produces results that are unfair, inequitable, or inconsistent with other social
values. Government intervention in this case is intended to conform the op-
eration of the market to the social value. Thus, a market may be efficient
yet produce results that are socially unacceptable.
The second issue considers the options available to the government to
obtain the economic or noneconomic result sought, while the third issue
considers which approach was actually chosen. The government has at its
disposal a relatively limited arsenal of regulatory approaches, and more than
one of these approaches may be relevant to the regulatory problem it is at-
tempting to solve. Likewise, the government can choose the institutional ar-
rangements under which regulation will take place. For example, the federal
government can directly regulate or it can employ states as the agents of
118. Justice Breyer primarily analyzed economic justifications, but he recognized that
noneconomic justifications might exist. These noneconomic justifications include unequal
bargaining power, rationalization, moral hazard, paternalism, and scarcity. Id. at 32-34.
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regulation.
The final issue is whether the government has chosen the most effective
method of regulation. If not, then, as Justice Breyer said, a "mismatch" has
occurred because government has failed "to correctly match the [regulatory
method or] tool [used] to the problem at hand."1 19 As noted, the problem
that the government is trying to resolve might be economic or noneconomic.
A mismatch may occur for two reasons. First, the government may misdi-
agnose the problem it is attempting to solve and may apply the wrong regu-
latory approach as a result. 2 ' Second, even if the problem is correctly iden-
tified, regulatory tools will vary in terms of their effectiveness and cost. In
other words, another regulatory response may generate lower costs or more
benefits. Even if a mismatch exists, however, the political system may not
be prepared to adopt a more efficacious approach.
The key to understanding how regulatory analysis brings coherence to
government regulation is the realization that there are a limited number of
justifications for government regulation and that there are a limited number
of methods or regulatory tools by which regulation can be implemented.
1 21
The next two sections describe and expand this key point.
The pedagogical value of regulatory analysis should now be clear. Stu-
dents should become familiar with the patterns of regulatory justification
and response. It is less necessary to know intimate details of multiple indus-
tries, which will come with experience and on a need-to-know basis, than it
is to understand the uses and limits of particular regulatory tools. In other
words, it is more important for students to know how licensing works for
nuclear power plants, magnetic resonance imaging, new drugs, and beauti-
cians than to know about the specific details of regulation of the electricity,
health care, pharmaceutical, and cosmetology industries. Armed with this
background knowledge, lawyers can appreciate and utilize policy arguments
that are appropriate to their fields of practice or service.
Regulatory analysis also gives scholars a common denominator from
which advanced arguments can be built. The ideas of "match" and
"mismatch" focus scholarly analysis on the justifications for a regulatory
program and the suitability of the regulatory tools used to carry it out.
These insights enable scholars to consider both the substantive and proce-
dural issues that arise from a regulatory program and to contribute to the
resolution of both.
119. Id. at 191.
120. A similar mismatch may occur if there is a change in the political climate and
political leaders no longer support the previous goal.
121. ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY ch. 1 (1994).
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IV. REGULATORY JUSTIFICATIONS
The first step in regulatory analysis is to consider whether there is an
economic or noneconomic justification for market failure. The approach
proposed here accepts the fact that economic theory has become the domi-
nant language of regulatory analysis today12 2 but posits that the analysis of
market failure is incomplete without consideration of noneconomic values.
2 3
Considerations such as fairness and equity are also the basis of regulation.1
24
The economic analyst starts with a preference for markets as a form of
social ordering. 125 Yet, markets often lack the necessary attributes or condi-
tions to be efficient. 126 The presence of such a "market failure" serves as a
justification for the government to enter into and fix a market in order to
achieve better allocative efficiency.
Under an economic justification, regulation is unnecessary in the absence
of efficiency defects. The noneconomic analyst starts with the premise that
society uses its political system to establish a set of values that defines how
society wishes to be organized. If markets operate in a manner inconsistent
with social values, the government's role is to conform a market's operation
to those values. In this view of regulation, law can legitimately constrain,
rather than merely perfect, market outcomes. 2 7 From the noneconomic per-
spective, the problem with relying exclusively on markets to organize social
relationships is that the operation of markets reflects only "commodity" val-
ues, or norms that reflect market exchanges. 1
2 8
122. McGARITY, supra note 83, at 13; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
AMERICAN LAW ch. 5 (1984); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Under-
standing of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 123, 123 (1989).
123. SHAPIRO& TOMAIN, supra note 39, at 58.
124. See e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, PUBLIC POLICY IN ANEW KEY (1993) (discussing "moral
conduct in an unregulated economy"); THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY CHOICE:
BEYOND THE MARKET PARADIGM (John Martin Gillroy & Maurice Wade eds., 1992)
(discussing efficiency in policy analysis and ethical demands of public policy); MARK
SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2-3
(1988) (identifying economic efficiency and "equity" as fundamental policy values).
125. Competitive markets achieve allocative efficiency as goods move to their highest
valued uses. In this manner, wealth is created, consumer and producer surpluses are
maximized, technological innovation is encouraged, and liberty and equality are enhanced
because individual choice is maximized. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive
Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953).
126. See infra Part V (discussing regulatory responses to market inefficiencies).
127. SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 57-58; RICHARD ANDREWS, Cost-Benefit Analysis as
Regulatory Reform, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
POLITICS, ETHICS, AND METHODS 107, 112 (D. Swartzman et al. eds., 1982).
128. Elizabeth Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 54,
59 (1988); see generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT ch.
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The dance between economic and noneconomic regulatory justifications,
that is between efficiency and equity, is a political pas de deux.129 No social
science model can predict precisely when one norm will trump the other.
More importantly for our purposes, no social science model that ignores one
or the other can succeed. Debates about health care, spotted owls, teenage
pregnancy, welfare, or cable television rates each use economic and
noneconomic policy arguments to greater or lesser degrees.
V. MATCH AND MISMATCH
Once the purpose of regulation is defined, our methodology considers the
efficacy of the regulatory method the government uses. This section ex-
plains the application of this methodology in the context of "economic" and
"social" regulation. The former generally refers to regulatory programs en-
acted in the first half of this century to protect the financial interests of con-
sumers. The social regulation generally refers to the regulatory programs
enacted in the 1960s and 1970s to protect the environment, reduce health
and safety risks, eliminate discrimination, and ameliorate poverty.
A. Economic Regulation
As explained before, regulatory analysis brings coherence to regulation
because it indicates that there are a limited number of regulatory justifica-
tions and methods. Economic regulation addresses three market failures-
natural monopoly, excessive competition, and economic rents-with two
regulatory tools-price controls or entry and exit controls.
1. Natural Monopoly
The regulation of public utilities is based upon the concept of natural mo-
nopoly, which leads to reduced output and higher consumer prices.130 Gov-
2 (1993); MARGARET JANE RDIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 32-34 (1993).
129. Christopher Schroeder, In the Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens, If Feasibility
Analysis Is the Answer, What Is the Question?, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1483, 1491 (1990);
MICHAEL REAGAN, REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF POLICY 208 (1987) (analyzing economic
principles in regulatory system's intellectual structures); see generally ARTHUR M. OKUN,
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).
130. SHAPIRO & TOI& JN, supra note 39, at 181-206. In industries in which there are
large front-end capital costs and economies of scale resulting in lower costs over a long
range of production, one firm will eventually monopolize the market because it can price
its goods lower than those of any new rivals. Because of these economic attributes, it is
cheaper to have a single telephone company run the telephone lines and one electrical util-
ity run a single set of electrical lines than to have multiple transmission systems. Conse-
quently, utilities, such as water, electricity, natural gas, telephone, and now cable televi-
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emiment has traditionally responded with a regulatory compact in which the
utility is given a monopoly to serve a particular territory and the government
uses rate making to set the utility's rates and impose a service obligation."'
Recently, however, disruptions in gas and electrical utility markets have
caused regulators to reassess this approach. 132 After closer examination of
utility markets indicated the potential for at least some competition, the gov-
ernment created "governmental markets" for utility sales.133 The term
sion, develop a common structure in which a good is produced, transported, and distributed
'to customers by an integrated firm. I ALFRED E. KA-N, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS, ch. 4 (1988); DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS
3-4 (1989) (analyzing concept of natural monopolies in its introduction). Noneconomi-
cally, the argument is that a utility's product is affected with a public interest and should
be universally available. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 39, at 301.
131. The government maintains the monopoly because having one firn produces the
lowest production costs. It protects consumers by attempting to set prices at a level that
would prevail in a competitive utility market. LEONARD S. HYMAN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIC
UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 195-96 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing natural monopo-
lies in reference to public utilities); see also Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810
F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
132. Federal and state rate making in the natural gas industry distorted markets so
much that artificial shortages were created, especially in the interstate market, and cheaper
gas was unavailable to consumers. See Stephen G. Breyer & Paul MacAvoy, The Natural
Gas Shortage and Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REv. 941 (1973); A.
TUSSING & C. BARLOW, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE & ECO-
NOMICS (1984); Richard J. Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead
to Burner Tip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of
Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 RA.Rv. L. REV. 345 (1983).
In addition, a series of events in the electrical utility markets, including the collapse of the
nuclear power industry, led to rising electricity costs, excess capacity in the industry, and
increased pressure for dramatic rate hikes. HYMAN, supra note 131, at 127-44; PAUL
JOSKOW & RICLARD SCHMIVALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC
UTILITY DEREGULATION (1983). Further, both industries were buffeted by the "energy cri-
sis" of the 1970s.
133. In the electricity industry, for example, Congress passed legislation giving pre-
ferred status to certain power producers and literally created a new market of non-utility
generators. See, e.g., STEVEN FERRY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER: DEVELOP-
MENT/COGENERATION UTILITY REGULATION (1991). In the natural gas and electrical indus-
tries, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has pried open transportation
access, thereby creating a new market for transportation services. James McManus, Natu-
ral Gas, in 2 ENERGY L. & TRANSACTIONS § 50.04(1)(d) (David J. Muchow & William A.
Mogel eds., 1995); Reinier H.J.H. Lock & Marlene L. Stein, Electricity Transmission, in 3
ENERGY L. & TRANSACTIONS ch. 81 (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 1995);
Floyd L. Norton, IV & Bruce L. Richardson, Electricity: Open Access, Wheeling and Com-
parability, in 3 ENERGY L. & TRANSACTIONS ch. 82 (David J. Muchow & William A.
Mogel eds., 1996); Jonathan D. Schneider, Richard M. Lorenzo & James C. Beh, Natural
Gas Transportation, in 3 ENERGY L. & TRANSACTIONS ch. 83 (David J. Muchow & Wil-
liam A. Mogel eds., 1994).
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"government markets" indicates a situation in which, through a statutory or
regulatory scheme, the government attempts to improve a market by chang-
ing its structure.
134
2. Excessive Competition
Regulation of excessive competition is based on the theory that in some
markets, powerful competition can force sellers to cut prices to the point
where many of them will go out of business or lower the quality of their
products or services. The theory contemplates that the public will be
harmed if firms fail to take safety precautions to save money or if they
charge prices higher than they could in a more competitive market. 135 After
the policy literature revealed that the transportation regulation based on this
theory unnecessarily raised consumer prices, the federal and state govern-
ments deregulated.' 36 Despite similar doubts about agricultural price sup-
ports, the government continues to intervene in agricultural markets because
134. Another example of a government market comes from the Clinton administra-
tion's failed plan for health care with the proposal for the creation of medical alliances.
See Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. § 5401 (1993). The medical alliances
created new market actors for the production and consumption of health care services. See
Paul Starr, Healthy Compromise: Universal Coverage and Managed Competition Under a
Cap, 12 AM. PROSPECT 44 (1993); David U. Himmelstein et al., Mangled Competition, 13
AM. PROSPECT 116-21 (1993).
135. SLPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 39, at 319; KAHN, supra note 130, vol. 2, at 172-
78; BREYER, supra note 117, at 29-30.
136. Government regulation of transportation services addressed excess competition by
using rate making to set prices and by controlling the entry and exit of firms. After policy
analysts demonstrated that regulation harmed consumers by keeping prices artificially
high, transportation was deregulated. See RICI.RD H.K. VIETOR, The Hubris of Regulated
Competition: Airlines, 1925-1988, in REGULATION: ECONOMIC THEORY AND HISTORY 19-58
(Jack High ed., 1991) (airlines); BREYER, supra note 117, ch. 12 (trucking); ALBRO
MARTIN, RAILROADS TRIUMPHANT: THE GROWTH, REJECTION, & REBIRTH OF A VITAL
AMERICAN FORCE 390 (1992) (railroads). The most visible changes occurred in the airline
industry where deregulation has been judged to be a qualified success. Consumers have
substantially benefited from increased competition, but pockets of competitive problems
remain. STEVEN A. MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE
DEREGULATION (1986); Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating "Deregulation" of Commercial
Air Travel: False Dichotomization, Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented Promises, 46
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109, 121 (1989); Alfred Kahn, Airlines Deregulation-A Mixed
Bag, but a Clear Success Nevertheless, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 229 (1988). But see PAUL S.
DEMPSEY, FLYING BLIND: THE FAILURE OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1990); HOUSE CoMm. ON
PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSP., NATIONAL COMM'N TO ENSURE A STRONG COMPETITIVE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY, H.R. REP. No. 103-22, at 3, 5, 9, 11 (1993) (increasing commission
membership, revising qualifications, and providing for Department of Transportation
funding outside funding cap for commissions).
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of the entrenched political power of agricultural interests. 1 The press of
the budget deficit, however, may cause Congress to reduce, if not end, agri-
cultural price supports. "
3. Economic Rents
The final area of economic regulation concerns "economic" rents, or the
excess profits earned by those who sell a good or service that is in short
supply. High prices (and high profits) in markets with scarce goods and
services are the product of normal market conditions. The justification for
reducing such "rents" is to promote "fairness."' 39 The most common type of
this regulation today is the control of the prices charged for rental housing in
urban areas. Such controls can stabilize neighborhoods and protect poor
persons, 141 but controls can also introduce economic distortions, such as
housing shortfalls and substandard housing stock, particularly if they are
widely used to limit rental prices for middle-class residents. 42
137. The excessive competition argument for government intervention in agriculture is
that foodstuffs are necessities that are best provided by a multiplicity of producers. But in
light of the huge supply of agricultural commodities, the reality is that government contin-
ues to intervene in agricultural markets to protect the profitability of sellers. E.C. PASOUR,
JR., AGRICULTURE AND THE STATE: MARKET PROCESSES AND BUREAUCRACY (1990). If es-
tablishing a floor for the income of farmers justifies price supports, the government should
use some form of means-testing to screen out wealthy recipients. As now constituted,
wealthy farm owners receive the majority of the benefits from agricultural programs. El-
mer W. Learn et al., American Farm Subsidies: A Bumper Crop, 84 P.B. INTEREST 66
(1986).
138. Congress passed a new farm bill that is supposed to phase out price supports for
most agricultural commodities after seven years. Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 104-127, § 171, 110 Stat. 888, 937. Although payments
to farmers end after seven years, the legislation may not be the end of subsidies. The price
supports under the old legislation were merely suspended and will take effect again in
2002 unless Congress passes legislation to end them. Guy Gugliotta, Congress Passes Bill
Dropping Agricultural Subsidies: Depression-Era Crop Program Replaced by System of
Declining Payments over 7 Years, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at A15.
139. SHAPIRO& TOMAIN, supra note 39, at 357-71; BREYER, supra note 30, at 22.
140. S PIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 39, at 371-80. There are prominent historical ex-
amples of regulation for this purpose, such as wage and price controls during the two
world wars and the excess profits tax imposed by President Carter on rents earned by do-
mestic oil producers because of the Arab oil embargo. Id. at 357-69.
141. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 87 (1993); J. Mandel, Does
Rent Control Hurt Tenants?: A Reply to Epstein, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1267, 1274
(1989).
142. Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOKLYNL. REv. 741, 753-55 (1988).
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B. Social Regulation
In social regulation, as in economic regulation, the government addresses
a small number of market failures with a limited set of regulatory tools.
Social regulation addresses four market failures: externalities, inadequate
information, scarcity, and public goods. The government responds with
regulatory or allocative controls.
1. Externalities
The policy literature contains both economic and noneconomic justifica-
tions for regulation of pollution, unsafe products, and other externalities, and
political deliberations reflect this conflict. 143  Whatever goals the political
system chooses, regulators must also determine which regulatory methods
are the most effective at achieving them. At one level, there is an issue con-
cerning the extent to which externalities should be addressed by tort law or
regulation. 144 At another level, there is an issue of what regulatory tools
143. Economic theory teaches that if the price of a good does not include the cost of the
social injuries that its production generates, the good will be overproduced and overcon-
sumed, and inefficiency results. The pollution a firm emits into the air, for example, cre-
ates costs that are external to the firm because it would not pay such costs in an unregu-
lated market. The market may produce an adjustment if the polluter and the victims of the
pollution can bargain over the extent to which the firm will pollute the air, but such trans-
actions require market conditions that are unlikely to exist, such as full information about
the consequences of the pollution, no significant transaction costs, and the absence of
strategic bargaining. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 37-56 (1992); FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: LAW & POLICY 16-44 (1984). In response, the government can seek to reduce
pollution to the point where the costs of such regulation exceed its benefits. SHA PIRO &
TOMAIN, supra note 39, at 403-14. Other analysts view protection of humans and the envi-
ronment as a social obligation apart from any economic considerations. Under the "social
obligation" approach, society may wish to mitigate an environmental or other risk to a
greater extent than a cost-benefit test would indicate. See, e.g., K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE,
RISK & RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS (1991); SAGOFF,
supra note 124, chs. 4-5 (illustrating weakness of cost-benefit test).
144. See NEIL K. KoMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY ch. 6 (1994). Congress's recognition that the tort system
did not sufficiently protect the environment, workers, and consumers motivated its enact-
ment of social regulation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Today, critics argue that juries
are too likely to assess excessive liability on the basis of emotion or in reliance on scien-
tific theories that have little or no support among responsible scientists, PETER W. HUBER,
GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); PETER W. HUBER, THE
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION (1991 ), while
defenders dispute that these are serious problems. Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galilieo's Retort:
Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1637 (1993).
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should be used. Agency regulation of externalities has relied principally on
standard setting or regulations that specify what preventive actions regulated
entities must take. Reformers are interested in adopting new forms of stan-
dard setting and in replacing this approach with government market solu-
tions. 45 Opponents generally do not dispute the theory behind such propos-
als but challenge whether they will work as well as existing approaches.
46
Reflecting this disagreement, Congress and agencies have implemented such
reforms on a case-by-case basis. 47
2. Inadequate Information
Regulation addressing the problem of inadequate information is uncontro-
versial, 148 but the method of regulation is not. Regulators can require sellers
to disclose information to consumers, such as happens with food labeling,
1 49
or they can require a seller to have a license that establishes minimum stan-
dards before a product or service can be sold, such as happens with pharma-
ceutical drug regulation by the Food and Drug Administration. 50 The first
option enhances the capacity of consumers to make their own product
choices. The second option limits the products or services that a consumer
might purchase. For this reason, reformers seek to replace licensing
schemes with information disclosure.15'
145. For example, they would replace command-and-control approaches with more
flexible approaches, such as performance standards, and replace (or augment) standard
setting with pollution taxes and pollution trading. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 8 1-82.
146. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729.
147. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7671f(1994) (requiring emissions trading).
148. A market will operate efficiently only if consumers have adequate information
about the qualities of the products they wish to purchase. Economic analysts agree that
sellers have economic incentives not to disclose information. Disclosure is costly, it may
aid competitors, and it may reduce demand. Consumers respond to negative information
about a seller's product by insisting on lower prices, by buying less, or by not buying the
product at all. SRAP1Ro & TomIN, supra note 39, ch. 10; TREBILCOCK, supra note 128,
chs. 5-6.
149. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 343 (1994).
150. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (1994).
151. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1, 10 (1995). Recent attempts by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
to speed the delivery of drugs, particularly drugs that may combat AIDS, illustrate the re-
form debate. Early approval may increase the risks of taking a drug because there is less
information about it, but the FDA's critics argue that the decision whether to take the drug
in such circumstances should be left to the consumer (with a physician's advice) instead of
FDA officials. George J. Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope, and Charity at the FDA: The
Politics ofAIDS Dng Trials, 34 VILL. L. REv. 771 (1989).
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3. Scarcity
Economic theory suggests no bounds on what should be traded on mar-
kets, but society may choose to block certain exchanges for moral, ethical,
or other social reasons,"' such as permitting a person's wealth to determine
who obtains a good. Regulation can be used to ban possession of some
goods, such as certain drugs or the pelts of animals that are in danger of ex-
tinction, or to prohibit market transactions for other activities, such as the
adoption of children'53 or purchase of human organs.1 14 If market transac-
tions are prohibited to determine who is entitled to a scarce good, the gov-
ernment must provide some alternative method of allocation, such as a
queue, lottery, auction, or allocation according to a public interest stan-
dard.155 The choice of a regulatory tool also poses difficult policy questions
and generates political controversy.'
5 6
4. Public Goods
There are both economic and noneconomic justifications for the regula-
tion of public goods. Private markets will not produce or will underproduce
public goods if persons who do not pay for such goods can still benefit from
them. 57 Further, society may simply find it morally unacceptable to permit
152. See PETER G. BROWN, RESTORING THE PUBLIC TRUST: A FRESH VISION FOR
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 56 (1994) (discussing blocked exchanges);
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 100
(1983) (same).
153. See J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341 (1984);
Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
154. See Emanuel Thorne, Tissue Transplants: The Dilemma of the Body's Growing
Value, 98 PUB. INTEREST 37 (1990) (illustrating how regulation may be used to ban pos-
session of goods).
155. Sa.PIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 39, at 529-38. An auction is different than market
allocation because the government can restrict who bids in the auction. This permits
regulators to establish conditions of ownership to service social goals.
156. For example, reformers contend that the Federal Communications Commission
should auction radio and television licenses to qualified applicants because ownership is a
valuable asset, like oil or timber on government lands, for which the public should receive
revenue. See In re Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 60 F.C.C. 2d 372, 443-47 (1976); R.H. Coase,
The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959). However, broadcast-
ers have been able to use their political power to block such proposals. Similarly, other
powerful interests, such as mining companies and cattle ranchers, have successfully used
their political influence to obtain government licenses at below-market rates. See, e.g.,
John C. Lacy, The Historic Origins of the U.S. Mining Laws and Proposals for Change, 10
NAT. RESOURCES& ENV'T 13 (1995).
157. Public goods such as education or welfare illustrate this problem. All citizens
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some citizens to starve, go uneducated, or be denied life-saving medical
treatment.15 8 The noneconomic and economic justifications overlap, but an
economic approach would consider whether the costs of such programs ex-
ceed the benefits, while a noneconomic approach would reject this utilitarian
benchmark.
The public generally accepts the idea of government payment for public
goods, but agreement breaks down concerning the size of the subsidy, who
should pay for it, and what the public should require of those who receive
the subsidy. These disputes relate to a lack of agreement about the goals of
these programs 159 and to the fact that, when government budgets are tight or
declining, the amount spent on one public good affects the amount spent on
other public goods.' 60 Because resolution of these disputes affects state and
local governments and key political constituencies, such as older persons,
school teachers, and veterans, these interests can be expected to resist detri-
mental changes, as recent efforts to reduce the federal budget vividly dem-
onstrate.
The literature on public goods also considers whether the proper regula-
tory tools are being used. In the present system, federal and state agencies
screen potential applicants for welfare, health, educational, job training, and
related programs under programs and eligibility standards largely estab-
lished by the federal government. Reformers claim that block grants and
government markets would reduce regulatory failure and save money, but
these claims are disputed by other analysts. Opponents respond that, be-
cause block grants would cede to the states more (or complete) responsibility
to determine what programs to implement and who is eligible, important na-
tional interests are likely to be ignored.16 ' A government market approach
benefit from having an educated citizenry and from welfare programs that reduce crime
and social disruption, yet these benefits cannot be denied to persons who do not pay for
them. For this reason, it is irrational for an individual to provide resources voluntarily for
welfare or public education if others may do so. That individual response multiplied over
the population is likely to yield a suboptimal amount of education or welfare assistance.
Government can solve the "free-rider" problem by relying on the tax system to pay for such
public goods. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 39, at 605-06, 671-72.
158. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-13 (1971).
159. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 21-22, 33. Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey explain,
for example, that there are "at least four thndamental conceptions of purpose that coexist,
often uneasily, in the design of American social welfare programs." THEODORE R.
MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS,
ENDURING REALITIES 23 (1990).
160. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 32 ("The classic public goods model fails to tell us
very much about how those trade-ofis ought to be made; neither does it describe how they
are made in fact.").
161. Proponents of block grants contend that, because state decisionmakers are closer
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would replace government provision of goods or services, such as education,
with vouchers that recipients could use to choose their own suppliers. 162
C. Trends and Patterns
This summary of government regulation only touches the surface of de-
velopments in the literature and how such policy recommendations are acted
on in the political system. Even this limited description, however, suggests
that certain common trends and patterns underlie the relationship of policy
and politics in the regulatory system. Applying the methodology identified
earlier, regulatory analysts consider whether a market failure (economic or
noneconomic) exists and which policy tool is the most appropriate to address
it. Political actors use this analysis to make the case for legislative or
agency decisions, but these decisions also reflect the impact of political in-
fluence, particularly in legislatures. These elements of government regula-
tion can be seen in both economic and social regulation.
As this section briefly explained, regulatory analysts have challenged the
goals of most forms of economic regulation. Rate setting for public utilities
rests on a justifiable policy premise, but the use of government markets is
gaining momentum in light of structural changes in utility markets. Agricul-
tural programs and rent controls potentially can serve redistributive goals,
but redistribution is difficult to justify as good public policy unless pro-
grams are narrowly tailored to benefit only the most needy recipients. Re-
form is stymied, however, when programs have powerful political sponsors.
Such sponsors were unable to save transportation regulation, however, once
reformers were able to publicize widely the policy arguments against such
regulation.
Regulatory analysts have challenged both the goals of social regulation
and the regulatory tools that are used in this area. The debate over goals
centers on the extent to which economic considerations should control envi-
to local social problems, states can better determine the efficacy of various alternative pro-
grams. Reformers also argue that block grants will permit a reduction in federal spending
because states can operate more efficiently without federal restrictions. Opponents re-
spond that there are important federal interests in how social problems are addressed,
which may not be taken into account by the states, and they dispute whether any efficien-
cies that can be derived from block grants will offset the large reductions in federal sup-
port that have been proposed.
162. Proponents of vouchers contend that competition for the business of consumers
will improve the quality of public services, such as secondary education. E.g., JOHN CHUBB
& TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990). Critics respond that
choice plans are unlikely to work and that they impose a high cost in terms of
(re)introducing school segregation by class and race. E.g., James Lieberman, Book Re-
view: Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259 (1991).
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ronmental, health and safety, and other consumer protection regulation. The
result in the political system, however, will also be influenced by the power
of regulated entities, which prefer a more economic orientation, and by the
extent to which legislators believe that the public prefers the social goals that
these programs now embody. Reformers would also like to replace current
approaches to social regulation with more market-oriented approaches.
These arguments reflect developments in the policy literature concerning
whether new approaches are more appropriate than existing tools. Again,
however, outcomes are influenced by political and institutional considera-
tions, such as the impact of changes in welfare programs on states and
regulatory beneficiaries.
CONCLUSION
This discussion of government regulation has scholarly and practical con-
sequences. From a scholarly standpoint, the discussion demarcates the
boundary between the traditional, formalistic administrative law scholarship
and the more normative and substantive study of the regulatory state. Tra-
ditional administrative law addresses the issues of how legal procedures are
and should be used to establish fair, efficient, and accountable administra-
tive decisionmaking. Government regulation scholarship, in distinction, in-
corporates rules of law and explores their interaction with policy, politics,
and other institutional influences. In short, the new government regulation
literature is the study of what we can and should expect of and receive from
the machinery of government.
Thus, government regulation scholarship invites discussion of what are
the proper goals and tools of the modem state. Identified patterns of regula-
tory justification and response are important to understand because they
form the underpinning of policy disputes concerning regulation. Our model
also explains how the political system addresses the issues and arguments
raised in the regulatory literature. Although the relationship of policy argu-
ments and political influence is not entirely clear, patterns can be identified
that shed light on how regulatory decisions are reached.
As a practical matter, our model invites lawyers and law students to bring
policy literature into their arguments on behalf of clients or employers.
Contemporary legal disputes are complex, involve statutes and regulations,
implicate a variety of interests of differing intensities, are multi-party and
often multi-jurisdictional, and require management of future relations as
much as resolution of past disputes. In short, good lawyering requires some
form of policy analysis skills. To this end, the methodology for regulatory
analysis presented here parallels the methodology for case analysis. Using
this methodology, the lawyer-policy analyst can assess whether regulation
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(or its absence) achieves allocative efficiency, distributive fairness, both, or
neither. Having learned this skill, the lawyer-policy analyst can interact with
legislatures and agencies, advise clients on strategy. advocate positions, and
mediate among conflicting interests and institutions.
163
Our model and regulatory methodology also suggest the rich research
agenda of technical as well as theoretical questions faced by government
regulation scholars. Scholars can compile a catalog of regulatory tech-
niques, variations, applications, and limitations and ask which form of
regulation is optimal. 164 From this catalog, scholars can explore such issues
as what are the synergies and unintended consequences of mixing and
matching regulatory goals and tools; the application of multiple tools to
complex markets; and the market signals that should initiate regulation and
deregulation.
Future research also includes institutional issues: What is the institutional
competence of each source of regulation'? What patterns of conflict exist
among institutions? Are there paradigm situations in which regulation
moves from the common law bench to the legislature'? Once in the legisla-
ture, should regulation take on a legislative form and be administered
through entitlements, or should the legislature merely set general goals and
defer to agencies for implementation?
There are also important issues concerning the political environment of
regulation. How does the regulatory state affect processes of democratic
self-governance? Do markets in government regulation exhibit the same
abuses in which unorganized groups (small or large) lose contests to small,
well-focused groups? Further, do these failures occur in cycles'? Are there
specific identifiable patterns of political failure'? Do interest groups, in their
quest for the accumulation of wealth and power, simply move from the mar-
ket to the legislature to the agency, until the rules for that accumulation
change, and then move back again to the market? Is power in the political
marketplace accumulated much like financial power in the economic mar-
ketplace? If so, are these systemic failures cyclical and ubiquitous'?
Finally, the research agenda will examine the normative dimensions of the
regulatory state. Can we more fully define economic and noneconomic
goals? When or in which circumstances does one dominate the other'? How
163. See DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VININO, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICE ch. 5 (2d ed. 1992); E.S. QUADE, ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DECISIONS (2d ed. 1989)
(illustrating importance of proposed methodology); see also JOE B. STEVENS, THE
ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE ch. 2 (1993); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A
THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 1-47 (1993).
164. See Robert A. Katzmann, Have We Lost the Ability to Govern? The Challenge of
Making Public Policy, 72 OR. L. REv. 231, 242 (1993) (discussing scholars' ability to
analyze which form of regulation is optimal).
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strong is the preference for market ordering? When and how should gov-
ernment focus on distributional considerations?
The answers to these questions and related issues will come from scholars
who work in the fields of law, economics, political science, and history. The
answers also involve empirical, interdisciplinary, and theoretical work in an
attempt to construct a better, more descriptive, and more predictive model of
regulatory behavior. Legal scholars are uniquely situated to contribute to
this effort. They are the most familiar with the substance of government
regulation, usually have personal experience with the process, and are not
limited by their professional training from considering what different disci-
plines have to say about the regulatory process.
The challenge to the regulatory analyst is to understand the process of
regulation and how to improve it. While administrative law scholarship has
come to an end, government regulation scholars have their work cut out for
them.
